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Abstract: Frequently, Security Monitoring is equated with network intrusion 
detection. However, Security Monitoring has a much broader scope. It also 
comprises detection of insider attacks. Since the Enron bankruptcy, monitoring of 
privileged access to financial data has become a legal requirement stipulated for 
example in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 404). Monitoring of privileged access 
requires evaluation of its necessity, permission, and correctness. As a result, 
detection of privileged access is not sufficient and must be reviewed in its business 
context. Data from various sources combined with business process contexts 
establish a sound basis for the assessment of a privileged access. Usually, the 
required data is spread over different data sources within an organization offering 
heterogeneous interfaces of any kind. Security administrators use multiple 
applications and data interfaces which result in a time-consuming and error prone 
process. Security Monitoring is, on the contrary, all about attack detection and 
prevention in a timely manner. This paper introduces the concept of service-
oriented context determination, which efficiently describes relationships between 
data snippets stored in multiple data sources. Exploiting the architectural paradigm 
of service oriented architecture (SOA), the concept establishes an integrated view 
of complex relationships and supports immediate reactions on suspicious events in 
the IT infrastructure. 
1 Introduction 
The collapse of Enron Corporation in late 2001 and WorldCom in 2002, and other large 
corporations led to a general weakness of the stock markets and the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar [7]. The ACFE Report of the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse 
lists 1134 occupational fraud cases, each causing a medium loss of USD 159.000 [1]. In 
the recent past, Société Générale uncovered “an exceptional fraud” which resulted in a 
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loss of 4.9bn Euros [19]. The fraud had been committed by a trader in charge of "plain 
vanilla" hedging on European index futures. In this case the trader was granted 
privileged access to trading systems allowing him to get unauthorized access to financial 
resources. The numerous scandals in the US and the European Union and continued 
weakness of the financial markets have led to a tightening of accounting and auditing 
regulation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 introduced new rules for the regulation of 
corporate governance and financial practices [18]. The European response has been a 
proposal that broadens the scope of the 8th Council Directive on Company Law, which 
primarily pertains to the approval of statutory auditors in EU member states [4]. The 
laws aim to ensure the accuracy of data reported in financial statements by improving the 
internal controls and accuracy of the processes.  
Today’s most business processes rely on information technology. Therefore, the internal 
controls must include the IT infrastructure and the IT processes summarized by the term 
IT Compliance Management [9]. In this context, implementing legal requirements and 
internal controls including the IT infrastructure is a real challenge [10, 12, 16].  
In response to legal requirements, many organizations have already implemented 
identity management solutions, as well as change and configuration management 
solutions. However, a significant and important security compliance gap which has not 
been successfully addressed by compliance management solutions is the detection and 
prevention of unauthorized access to sensitive data and misuse of privileged access 
rights.  
The ITIL security management process [17, 11] describes the structured fitting of 
security in the management organization based on the Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management defined by ISO/IEC 27002 [8]. In this context, event monitoring 
plays an important role with respect to the effective implementation, monitoring, and 
enforcement of regulatory requirements [6]. Specifically, this holds for event correlation, 
which is software technology that observes, classifies, and correlates message streams 
and informs human or technology recipients of system events, enabling the recipients to 
react in an appropriate way. Despite filtering of security-relevant events and correlation 
of security incidents there remains a considerable amount of events which must be 
analyzed by human recipients in a timely manner. Automated provisioning of relevant 
context information offers a high potential for optimally reducing reaction time, effort 
and risk. 
2 Requirements Analysis 
This chapter defines a set of common requirements for an efficient solution for 
privileged access analysis. The requirements were elicited and recorded during a study 
conducted in a security operations center responsible for monitoring user activity. The 
first subchapter introduces a scenario demonstrating the complexity of the problem 
domain and the weaknesses of current approaches. 
2.1 Scenario “Unauthorized Change” 
Stephan is security administrator working in a team of security specialists monitoring a 
world-wide security infrastructure 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. At 6 p.m., Stephan’s 
security console displays the following security event: 
„17:54:03.00: User admin12 logged in with privileged access on host 
obaserver1.company.com“ 
Knowing that administrator activity during business hours on an online banking server is 
unusual, Stephan searches for planned administrative changes in the change management 
system. Since there is no entry for a scheduled change on the affected server, Stephan 
must follow a pre-defined process to investigate the suspicious event. Following the 
process Stephan checks multiple conditions to assess the event: 
1. Identify user: Stephan resolves the user name admin12 using the local user 
identity management system (UID System) and determines the owner of the 
user name. Using the hostname and the login name, he finds the user “John”. 
2. Determine user status and role: Stephan navigates through the human resources 
directory (HR System) and brokering system. He finds out that the person 
belongs to the company since 2001, currently working as investment broker 
with an upper limit of 500.000 EUR.  
3. Classify host system: Stephan extracts the complete hostname from the asset 
management system (Asset Database) and looks up the name in the list of 
classified systems (CSV-Export). Since the system is listed as a critical asset, 
Stephan must perform further investigations with high priority.  
4. Assess access violation: Analyzing the log files of the system (Event Data), 
Stephan detects a modification of transactions on a brokering application. The 
application controls the investment activities of the company. The stored 
transactions will be executed at the end of the business day (6 p.m.) by a batch 
job which leads Stephan to classify the security event as critical. 
5. Gather contact information: Using the human resources directory, Stephan 
gathers contact details of John and John’s manager but cannot reach any of 
them. Stephan contacts the security department and gets informed that both 
persons have left the building. 
6. Analyse historical data: The examination of the event records associated with 
the user and the host reveals the existence of a similar case five months ago. In 
that case John has logged in to the system without doing any modifications to 
the system. 
The next day reveals that John successfully modified a colleague’s transactions and that 
the manipulations caused a significant loss for the company. Figure 1 presents an 
overview of the set of data and their relationships used in our scenario. 
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Figure 1: Interrelated data sets of the example scenario 
2.2 Requirements for an Efficient Event Assessment 
The adequate assessment of suspicious events (security relevant events) requires 
sophisticated information about the business context which can be derived using data 
stored in different data sources. Due to the evolutionary character of an organisation’s 
information systems and structures, the necessary data is stored in heterogeneous 
systems, mostly offering solely proprietary interfaces. Furthermore, data protection 
policies and laws require limited access to this data. Heterogeneous applications and data 
silos constrain an efficient linking of data required for the compliance management.  
 Figure 2 depicts the situation of a security administrator and his need to 
manually access multiple applications at the same time.  
To this end, the scenario in chapter 2.1 and the current information technology 
infrastructure lead to the following set of requirements for an approach fostering 
efficient compliance management: 
• Standardized data access: To enable the automated gathering of context-
relevant information and meet the evolutionary nature of the IT landscape, the 
different information systems must provide standardized interfaces for efficient 
and effective access to the data. 
• Relationship description: For the creation of the relevant business context 
regarding a security event, mechanisms allowing the description of 
relationships between information entities of different applications and their 
usage at runtime must be provided. 
• Tool support: To allow for an assessment of the security events and the related 
business context, the security administrators require a dedicated tool presenting 
the information adequately. 
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 Figure 2: Manual context creation and assessment 
3 Concepts for an Efficient Event Assessment 
The following sections describe our concepts for the service-oriented context creation in 
a distributed and heterogeneous system landscape. The first subsection includes a brief 
architectural overview which helps understand the key aspects of the concept. The 
following section focuses on a process model for the event assessment as well as 
creating a homogeneous access layer for data spaces within different heterogeneous 
systems. The final section introduces mechanisms for descriptions and evaluations of 
relations and interdependencies between information entities located in different data 
sources with the aim to create a unified and navigable information space for the problem 
domain. 
3.1 Architectural Overview 
Figure 3 depicts an overview of our architectural solution. Within an organization, there 
are several stakeholders involved in event assessment. Being a complex task and 
involving multiple information sources, event assessment cannot be done manually. The 
stakeholders need tool support for efficient and effective event assessment. The tool 
must integrate data stored in distributed, heterogeneous data sources, combine the data, 
and enable the user to recognize the fraudulent actions. As aconcept for the integration 
of heterogeneous data sources, partly within different organizational units, the paradigm 
of service-oriented architecture (SOA) [3] has been selected, enabling the use of various 
data for IT Compliance Management processes through a service layer. 
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Figure 3: Service-oriented enabling of IT Compliance Management processes 
3.2 Service-oriented context creation and assessment 
The process for investigating suspicious events in the domain of IT Compliance 
Management can be divided into four different phases. These phases are data pre-
analysis, context creation, context evaluation and resolution. The phase data pre-analysis 
is initiated by a security event which was classified as suspicious by a dedicated Security 
Event Management System and needs further investigation. During the context creation 
phase, information units will be extracted from multiple sources using standardized 
interfaces. Based on the predefined relationships between data entities within different 
data sources, the phase context creation addresses the extraction of event-related 
information from several data sources via standardized interfaces. In this context, 
common data sources are asset management systems, systems for employee data (HR) as 
well as change management systems. During the next phase, context evaluation, a 
support tool (Security Cockpit) provides dedicated views of the context supporting 
efficient and fast risk estimation. Furthermore an expert system component supports the 
event investigator by proposing problem solution strategies which are based on former 
cases and the resolution is conducted in the final phase resolution. Our concept focuses 
on context creation and context evaluation due to the high potential for reducing manual 
data collection time and the related error-proneness as depicted in Figure 4. 
In order to establish the entire context for security events, information from different 
heterogeneous and distributed data sources has to be integrated. Our concept leverages a 
service-oriented architecture making the core enterprise data sources available as 
standard and reusable web services. Data providers which encapsulate underlying 
information sources as a service can be used by different consumers. By using the 
standardized, strongly reusable and evolutionary CRUDS-Interface [14] we achieve a 
homogeneous service access layer. As a consequence, these services can be embedded 
and reused in different scenarios [5]. CRUDS is the abbreviation for the methods Create, 
Read, Update, Delete and Search which are provided by a service in combination with a 
managed set of specific information or business objects in particular. 
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Figure 4: Component model. 
Furthermore, extensibility is an important requirement for our approach as the 
integration of additional data sources allows the improvement of the event assessment by 
taking more context information into account and the IT landscape may change due to 
new IT systems. In both cases, domain experts need to identify and analyze the relevant 
information contained in the additional systems. The information consists of business 
objects having unique identifiers (e.g. employee, change ticket, hostname) as well as 
search patterns or single attributes (e.g. isEmployee, ticketStatus). In a next step, the 
methods of the CRUDS-interface, which have to be realized according to the needs, are 
identified. This is done with respect to security and data privacy aspects like data 
minimality [2]. The Read-method supports the request of business objects by name. If 
different access rights for multiple fine granulated views are needed, facade methods can 
be implemented. This means an interface will be extended with dedicated methods 
which uses the core method of the CRUDS-Interface (in this case READ) but only a 
small portion of the business object will be returned. Thus, the service consumers’ needs 
Resolution 
can be adequately fulfilled and specific authorization concepts can be implemented. The 
Search-method supports retrieval of information by defining search parameters. The 
methods Create, Update, Delete are not used for the context creation but can  give 
improvement in other scenarios (also outside the domain of IT Compliance 
Management). A trivial scenario for Update would be the closure of a problem ticket 
after successful evaluation of an event assessment. 
3.3 Description and evaluation of data dependencies 
The security event itself is the initial starting point for context creation. By evaluating 
dependencies between the security event and existing data spaces, the use-case specific 
requirements will be defined. The specific context realization is carried out by requesting 
the information through the standardized interfaces defined in chapter 3.2. The 
description of dependencies between different data units in the area of compliance 
management is based on ontologies. Therefore, objects of existing domain models - such 
as persons or IT resources (CIM-Ontology [15]) - are applied and extended. The 
resulting meta model provides the basis for a standardized data space and allows data 
spaces of single systems to be mapped to an abstract concept. This way, point-to-point 
linking between information of a system to other used data spaces is not needed 
anymore. Thus, the specification and categorization of different security related events 
as well as their linking to concepts within the ontology, allows the abstract definition of 
the relevant event context for the event assessment. 
To realize a concrete event context, the event must be classified according to the schema 
of the ontology which in turn defines the abstract information needs of that context. With 
the initial linking of the data spaces of the existing IT system to the ontology, these 
needs can be satisfied by accessing the corresponding systems via the interfaces defined 
in chapter 3.2. These interfaces allow standardized operations on selected sets of 
business objects and the creation of the event context.  
To enrich the event context with further information, the analysis of the attributes of the 
event and the gathered context is promising. As shown in the example scenario in 
section 2.1, these attributes often contain identifiers of related objects residing within 
different data sources. To identify and use these additional data dependencies to extend 
the event context, a catalogue of search patterns can be created and applied. 
4 Implementation 
The first prototype to support service-oriented event assessment in a distributed and 
heterogeneous environment consists of five Web services, implementing the access 
method to relevant data sources. Based on the business context, we defined the business 
objects, the data dependencies and implemented the CRUDS-interfaces to access the 
data sources. In particular, the data of the following systems were considered: A Security 
Event Management System (IBM Tivoli Risk Manager), a Change Ticket System 
(Peregrine Service Center), a Problem Ticket System (BMC Remedy), an Asset 
Management System based on an IBM DB2 database and a Human Resources directory 
service. 
The Security Cockpit, implemented as a Java Client application, offers a user friendly 
interface for exploiting the established event context using Web service connectors. One 
of the connectors loads the IT security events from the Security Event Management 
System. Based on the data relationships defined in an XML configuration file the 
requirements for the investigation context are determined (relation based event 
assessment) and the context is created by calling the Web services. 
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Figure 5: Prototype. 
The Security Cockpit presents the newly created, event- and user role-specific context. 
The user starts assessing the event in this highly adapted environment in an efficient 
way. The specific view depends on the user's tool configuration and role [13]. An expert 
system component supports the user by showing him problem solving strategies and 
results of similar cases which have been investigated in the past. The expert system 
exploits a classification system for security related events. Having completed the event 
assessment, the user documents the solution and which of the historic solutions helped to 
resolve the current solution. Thus, the expert system improves the knowledge base for 
future event investigations. 
In a pilot project the prototype was tested and has shown big potential for our concept. 
New data sources were integrated and their information objects linked with each other. 
The standardized CRUDS-interface simplified the integration of different data sources 
and context creation. In summary, the prototype facilitates and improves the 
investigation of security events with respect to effort and complexity.  
 
Figure 6: Security Cockpit. 
5 Summary and Outline 
The assessment of IT security events is a mandatory sub process in the area of IT 
Compliance Management and helps to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to IT 
resources. The investigation of security events in an adequate and efficient way requires 
creating and evaluating the entire context of the business case. Due to the heterogeneity 
and complexity of today's IT systems and dependencies between information sources 
this task is challenging. 
Considering this background, this article presents a concept which allows the efficient 
linking of information between diverse data sources to support IT Compliance 
Management processes. Core aspects are the definition of standardized interfaces which 
allow access to data and taking into consideration relations between data units of 
different data spaces. During a pilot project, a prototype implementing the concept 
showed its potential in a real world environment and the transferability of the approach 
to other scenarios. 
As a next step we will investigate whether the proposed concept can be exploited to 
further automate the real-time evaluation of security events. Moreover, an evaluation of 
the approach regarding the response time to suspicious events as well as the quality of 
the problem resolution will be conducted. Furthermore, future work will address aspects 
of security and privacy related questions as well as reducing cognitive load of users 
working with the prototype. 
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